William & Mary Law Review
Volume 58 (2016-2017)
Issue 5 Judicial Supremacy v. Departmentalism
Symposium

Article 7

4-1-2017

The Annoying Constitution: Implications for the Allocation of
Interpretive Authority
Frederick Schauer

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Repository Citation
Frederick Schauer, The Annoying Constitution: Implications for the Allocation of Interpretive
Authority, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1689 (2017), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol58/iss5/
7
Copyright c 2017 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr

THE ANNOYING CONSTITUTION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
ALLOCATION OF INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY

FREDERICK SCHAUER*
ABSTRACT
Constitutional constraints often restrict unwise or immoral official
policies and actions, but also often invalidate laws and other official
acts that are sound as a matter of both morality and policy. These
second-order side constraints—or trumps—on even official acts that
are sound as a matter of first-order policy reflect deeper or longerterm values, and they are central to understanding the very idea of
constitutionalism. Moreover, once we see the Constitution as restricting not only the unsound and the unwise but also the sound and the
wise, we can understand why expecting those whose sound ideas and
policies are nevertheless unconstitutional to impose those constraints
on themselves is psychologically and politically unrealistic. Judicial
interpretive supremacy can be justified, therefore, not only by the
positive virtues of authoritative settlement, but also by the negative
virtues of precluding officials from enforcing and interpreting constitutional constraints on themselves.

* David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia
School of Law. This Article was prepared for the William & Mary Law Review’s Symposium
on Judicial Supremacy v. Departmentalism in March 2016, and I am grateful for helpful
audience comments and questions on that occasion.
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INTRODUCTION
Many bad policies are constitutionally permissible. And many
good policies are constitutionally impermissible. The former category is obvious, and few would doubt the constitutionality of, for
example, lowering the speed limit on interstate highways to fortyfive miles per hour, or abolishing the National Park Service. But the
existence of the latter category is often less salient, and it is easy—
too easy—to associate unconstitutionality with outcomes that are
also defective on moral or policy grounds. State-enforced de jure
segregation of the public schools is unconstitutional,1 but, the Constitution aside, it is also immoral and bad policy. So too with confessions extracted by physical coercion,2 regulations enacted with the
express purpose of disabling a particular religion,3 and much else.
Although many actions of government and its officials are indeed
both unconstitutional and unsound on moral or policy grounds, on
closer examination we discover many other actions, sound as a matter of morality and policy, that are nevertheless unconstitutional.
Or, to put it another way, a careful look at the full breadth of
constitutional decisions reveals that the realm of justified unconstitutionality is occupied not only by the immoral and the unwise, but
also by actions that are—but for their unconstitutionality—largely
justifiable on both moral and policy grounds. The history of American constitutional law is consequently replete not only with bad
policies struck down in the name of the Constitution, but also with
good policies adopted by well-intentioned policymakers and
politicians that have suffered the same fate, and properly so.4
Once we recognize that the Constitution serves not only to keep
bad governments and bad governors from doing bad things, but also
attempts to keep, in the service of deeper or longer-term values,

1. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
2. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 279, 287 (1936) (holding that confession
extracted “by brutality and violence” violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
3. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542
(1993) (invalidating ordinance enacted with express “animosity” toward a particular religion).
4. See infra Part I.
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good governments and good governors from doing good things,5 some
of the traditional debate about the allocation of constitutional
interpretive authority is seen in a different light. Insofar as constitutional law imposes second-order6 or side constraints7 on first-order
wise policies, we can appreciate that expecting politicians, policymakers, and their constituents to set aside their own sound policy
preferences in the service of less obvious, less immediate, and
possibly less congenial goals is, although not impossible, highly
unlikely, for reasons that are both political and psychological.
Judicial interpretive supremacy emerges, therefore, as a potentially
justifiable approach not because of some inherent superiority of the
courts, and not (only) because the courts may be well-situated to
perform a valuable settlement function in the face of moral, political, legal, and constitutional disagreement,8 but also because the
alternatives to judicial interpretive supremacy may impose upon the
political branches of government tasks they cannot reasonably be
expected to perform. In what follows I hope to explain and support
the conclusions I have thus far done no more than announce.

5. Cf. KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE 25 (Benjamin Nelson ed., Harper Torchbooks 1968) (1962) (urging that we
replace a concern for who our rulers should be with a concern for organizing “our political
institutions so that bad or incompetent rulers ... cannot do too much damage” (emphasis omitted)). Popper’s focus is, in important respects, the mirror image of my focus in this Article, but
the point is still that wise institutional design involves weighing the expected (in the
statistician’s sense of expected value) harms and costs that might come from empowering bad
officials to make bad decisions against the expected harms and costs that might come from
disabling good officials from making good decisions.
6. On the notion of second-order considerations (and thus of second-order constraints),
see the description and analysis in Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order
Decisions, 110 ETHICS 5 (1999); see also JOSEPH RAZ , PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 35-40
(Oxford University Press 1999) (1975) (explaining second-order reasons as reasons that
operate on other reasons); Stephen R. Perry, Second-Order Reasons, Uncertainty, and Legal
Theory, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 913-19 (1989) (same).
7. On the idea of a side constraint, see infra text accompanying notes 19-21.
8. I have argued as much previously. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1377-81 (1997) (observing
that the settlement function of law may provide one reason in favor of judicial interpretive
supremacy); see also Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy:
A Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 471-77 (2000) (same).
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I. THE ANNOYING CONSTITUTION
Some decades ago, Ronald Dworkin famously described rights as
“trumps.”9 In choosing this characterization, Dworkin sought to
describe, more or less accurately in my view, a world in which most
governmental decisions were made on policy grounds.10 Some of
these decisions might involve a systematic cost-benefit analysis,11
but most policy decisions emerge from a less formal assessment of
which policy will most increase the aggregate welfare either of the
population as a whole or of some particular constituency. For
Dworkin, the basis for many of these decisions is a utilitarian
calculation aimed at identifying the policies that will produce the
greatest net welfare (or, for some utilitarians, pleasure or happiness).12 We can broaden this claim to understand it as maintaining
that the normal policy decision is a consequentialist one seeking to
maximize good consequences under some conception of which kinds
of good (or bad) consequences are to count in the consequentialist
calculus.13
Dworkin was not especially concerned with the subtleties of
consequentialist or utilitarian policy analysis.14 Instead, he stressed
9. RONALD DWORKIN , TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at xi, 188-93 (1977) [hereinafter
DWORKIN , TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]; see Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES
OF RIGHTS 153 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984); see also RONALD DWORKIN , JUSTICE FOR
HEDGEHOGS 329 (2011) [hereinafter DWORKIN , JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS].
10. See DWORKIN , TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 9, at 191-93.
11. See generally, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS 2-3 (2006); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF
REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002); Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1371, 1371-72 (1998); Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis:
Definition, Justification, and Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD . 1153, 115357 (2000).
12. See DWORKIN , TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 9, at 95. On the varieties of
utilitarianism, see THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO UTILITARIANISM (Ben Eggleston & Dale E.
Miller eds., 2014); Dan W. Brock, Recent Work in Utilitarianism, 10 AM . PHIL. Q. 241, 253-61
(1973).
13. Utilitarianism is the subset of consequentialism presupposing that utility is the
consequence to be maximized. But other consequentialisms seek to maximize consequences
other than utility. See generally Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, STAN . EN CYCLOPEDIA PHILOSOPHY , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism [https://perma.
cc/7HAK-9FNB] (last revised Oct. 22, 2015).
14. See DWORKIN , TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 9, at xi-xii.
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the idea that rights serve as a check—or trump—on even genuinely
welfare- or utility-maximizing policies.15 With respect to many applications, the idea is fundamentally sound. Even if suppressing a
minority religion, for example, would make the majority happier or
richer, it would still be the wrong thing to do precisely because
individual freedom of religion will trump even genuinely welfaremaximizing policies. Freedom of religion as an individual right is
thus an instance, under Dworkin’s conception of rights as trumps,
of something that cannot be withheld even if depriving some people
of that right will make most people, in the aggregate, happier or in
some other way better off.16 So too, he argued, with rights to
freedom of speech, with the rights of criminal defendants, and—for
him, most importantly—with rights to equality.17 It is simply wrong,
he insisted, for a majority to make things worse for a racial or ethnic
minority even if doing so would make the majority better off.18
Dworkin’s idea of rights as trumps uses different language to
label what the philosopher Robert Nozick had earlier described as
“side constraints.”19 The idea is similar. Side constraints limit, from
an external or outside perspective, what can be pursued internally
by application of some form of consequentialism.20 Side constraints
intrude themselves, making impermissible actions or policies that
might be justifiable on utilitarian or other consequentalist grounds
absent the side constraint.21
Although both Dworkin and Nozick focused on rights, the idea of
second-order trumps or side constraints is even more broadly applicable. Most importantly here, it is applicable to a vast swath of
15. For a more technical development of this idea, which sometimes goes under the name
of “threshold deontology,” see Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and Economics:
Integrating Moral Constraints with Economic Analysis of Law, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 343-47
(2008).
16. See DWORKIN , JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 9, at 345-46.
17. See id. at 329-31.
18. See DWORKIN , TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 9, at 96, 146-47.
19. See ROBERT NOZICK , ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26-53 (1974). Similar ideas are
found in JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON , THE REALM OF RIGHTS 153-54 (1990); and JUDITH JARVIS
THOMSON , Some Ruminations on Rights, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION , AND RISK : ESSAYS IN MORAL
THEORY 49, 52-55 (William Parent ed., 1986).
20. See NOZICK, supra note 19, at 29-33, 39, 51-52.
21. See Zamir & Medina, supra note 15, at 325-26 (“The pursuit of good consequences is
subject to constraints. Certain acts are inherently wrong and are therefore impermissible
even as a means to furthering the overall good.”).
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constitutional law. Although constitutions constitute governments
and their component parts22 and empower those component parts to
take actions of various kinds,23 constitutions also typically play an
important role, by establishing rights and otherwise, in limiting
governments in exactly the way that Dworkin and Nozick have in
mind. To put it differently, constitutions impose second-order constraints on even sound first-order policies or other governmental
decisions. Constitutions thus not only attempt to keep racists,
sexists, power-grabbers, dissent-suppressors, rogue police officers,
bribe-takers, and other similarly undesirable officials from taking
undesirable actions or adopting undesirable policies. They also, as
previewed above,24 constrain wise, well-meaning, and astute governmental officials from pursuing in good faith policies that can
genuinely be expected to have advantageous outcomes for the population at large.
The virtues of this side-constraint aspect of constitutional constraint may not always be obvious, but constitutions disable wise
and well-intentioned officials and institutions from doing what seem
to be good things for multiple reasons. Sometimes, perhaps most
often, constitutions do so in the service of individual rights—individual rights against the majority and not for the benefit of the majority.25 And at other times they do so because the stability provided
by constitutions may preclude actions and policies that look advantageous in the short-term but may have longer-term negative
consequences,26 or because keeping a constitution functioning is
itself often a valuable long-term consequence that demands the
22. For example, Congress is not only regulated by the Constitution, but is also created
by it. U.S. CONST. art I, § 1. Without the Constitution, there would be no Congress, just as
without the constitutive rules of football, there would be no touchdowns. On constitutive rules
generally, see JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 3334 (1969); see also JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 27-29 (1995). For
application of the idea to constitutional law, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional
Constraints, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 986 (2009).
23. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (listing the powers of Congress); id. art. III, § 2
(empowering federal courts to decide cases and controversies arising under the Constitution,
laws, and treaties of the United States).
24. See supra text accompanying note 4.
25. See DWORKIN , TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 9, at 133; see also THE
FEDERALIST NO . 51 (James Madison).
26. And hence the ubiquity of “slippery slope” arguments in constitutional law. See
Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 368-69 (1985).
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invalidation of actions that seem to be right for the immediate
circumstances but which nevertheless violate that constitution.27
Examples of the phenomenon just described are rampant. When
courts enforce the so-called dormant Commerce Clause, for example,
they say to the states that even those policies designed in good faith
to assist a state’s residents and industries—and which may often
actually assist those residents and industries—are nonetheless
unconstitutional because of the larger constitutional interest in a
single national market.28 When bipartisan congressional measures
aimed at adapting a 1787 document to the realities of modern
legislative life are invalidated, the Supreme Court treats compliance
with the formal requirements for legislative validity as a side
constraint on what would otherwise seem to be a wise and efficient
legislative approach.29 And when the Supreme Court holds that
some seemingly valuable policy measure is beyond Congress’s power
under the Commerce Clause,30 it again imposes second-order constraints of power limitations (or of jurisdiction, in the nontechnical
sense) on what might appear to be wise and even needed first-order
policies.
The foregoing examples each involved federalism or separation of
powers constraints, but more commonly such constraints will come
from individual rights—specifically, individual rights against
majoritarian decision-making and against majoritarian welfare
27. See DWORKIN , TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 9, at 106-07.
28. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265, 277 (1984) (invalidating a
tax differential designed to assist the Hawaiian indigenous fruit wine industry); City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (striking down a New Jersey statute
aimed at limiting the quantity of solid and liquid environmentally harmful waste disposed in
New Jersey landfills).
29. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954, 958-59 (1983) (invalidating a seemingly efficient
“one-House veto” for failure to comply with Article I’s bicameralism and presentment
requirements); see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 420-21, 448-49 (1998)
(invalidating the Line Item Veto Act on similar grounds); Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v.
Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 275-76 (1991) (holding that
delegating legislative power to an administrative board of review violated bicameralism and
presentment requirements).
30. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586-93 (2012)
(holding that individual mandate portion of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
exceeded congressional power under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 626-27 (2000) (invalidating the Violence Against Women Act on Commerce Clause
grounds); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (invalidating Gun-Free School
Zones Act as beyond Congress’s commerce power).
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maximization.31 In Palmore v. Sidoti, for example, a likely wellmeaning judge who plausibly feared that a white child in 1983
Florida might have a more stressful and otherwise difficult childhood growing up in a mixed-race household than he would with his
white father proceeded on that basis to award custody to the
father.32 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously, and
seemingly easily, that taking race into account in a custody proceeding, even for apparently benign and well-intentioned purposes,
was plainly impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause.33
Similarly, the Court held in Orr v. Orr that a statistically justified
differential between men and women for purposes of granting alimony, and for purposes of ensuring that women were adequately
provided for after divorce, was invalidated as impermissible gender
discrimination, again despite the fact that the legislature’s motives
were seemingly benign, and despite the fact that Alabama’s statute
rested on a sound (at least at the time) statistical basis.34
Not surprisingly, the effect of individual rights as side constraints
or trumps on sound or efficient policies arises with considerable
frequency with respect to issues of criminal procedure. Most generally, it is at least plausible that the privilege against self-incrimination itself is of this character,35 especially if we understand it as
often (even if far from always) excluding relevant and reliable
evidence in criminal prosecutions and thus impeding a community
interest in crime control. And insofar as the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement and limitation on searches and seizures36 even
more often serve to exclude reliable and sometimes necessary
evidence,37 the Fourth Amendment too can be seen as an entirely
31. I use “majoritarian” loosely, recognizing that legislative and official action often
responds to intense preferences by a minority of the population. See Saul Levmore, Voting
with Intensity, 53 STAN . L. REV . 111, 142-43 (2000); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Identifying
Intense Preferences, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1391, 1393-94 (2009).
32. See 466 U.S. 429, 430-31 (1984).
33. See id. at 430-34.
34. See 440 U.S. 268, 281-83 (1979).
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Emily Rebekkah Hanks, Note, Body Language:
Should Physical Responses to Interrogation Be Admissible Under Miranda?, 11 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & LAW 89, 120 (2003) (describing Justice Powell’s majority opinion in Jenkins v.
Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980), as recognizing the “social costs of the Fifth Amendment”).
36. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
37. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Constitution and the Police: Individual Rights and Law
Enforcement, 66 WASH . U. L.Q. 11, 23 (1988) (acknowledging the costs of the Fourth Amend-
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justifiable individual rights side constraint on the state’s also justifiable interest in convicting the guilty and ensuring a greater degree
of community safety.38
More concretely, consider the line of cases strengthening the
Sixth Amendment’s confrontation requirement,39 and especially
Hammon v. Indiana.40 In Hammon, as in many post-Crawford domestic violence cases,41 the requirement of confrontation was held
to preclude testimony by a police officer about a victim’s complaint
because of the nonappearance of the victim at trial, despite the fact
that such nonappearance is a disproportionately frequent phenomenon in domestic violence situations.42 Hammon is thus an apt
example of a side constraint rendering impermissible a seemingly
welfare-maximizing act by a good faith public servant, but arguably
doing so in the service of the larger and longer-term values that the
Sixth Amendment’s confrontation requirement is designed to serve.
The side constraints imposed on criminal prosecutions illustrate
well the constitutional constraints on otherwise sound policy decisions or public acts, but perhaps not nearly as well as a host of cases

ment).
38. Eliminating either the privilege against self-incrimination or the warrant requirement, or both, would almost certainly increase the number of innocent people convicted. But
it would likely increase the number of guilty people convicted as well. And although the
utilitarian calculation would be complex and contested, it is plausible to assume that such an
approach (as well as lessening the existing requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt)
would be welfare-enhancing in the aggregate, questions of individual rights aside. Cf. In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970) (questioning the use of a reasonable doubt standard in
juvenile proceedings). See generally LARRY LAUDAN , TRUTH , ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW : AN
ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY (2006); Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas,
41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 65 (2008).
39. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004) (ruling the Sixth Amendment
is violated any time a “testimonial statement” is admitted without opportunity for crossexamination). Most recent is Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2181 (2015), which continued the
testimonial statement test but narrowed the category of statments that are considered
testimonial.
40. 547 U.S. 813, 829-30 (2006) (decided along with Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813
(2006)).
41. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 749-50
(2005); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle: Domestic Violence and the Right of Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2006).
42. Hammon, 547 U.S. at 829-34; see Heather Fleniken Cochran, Improving Prosecution
of Battering Partners: Some Innovations in the Law of Evidence, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & LAW 89,
100 (1997).
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arising under the First Amendment’s Speech and Press Clauses.43
Here the existing doctrines protect Klansmen who advocate racial
violence,44 cross-burners who wish to intimidate African-Americans,45 neo-Nazis who seek to intimidate Holocaust survivors,46
distributors of the virtual child pornography often used by pedophiles to entice young children into sexual acts,47 purveyors of films
and video recordings of animal torture,48 individuals who seek to
cause emotional distress to the families of deceased soldiers,49 video
game companies that profit from providing to minors the virtual
experience of rape and murder,50 and countless other undesirable
individuals offering equally undesirable messages. Typically those
who would restrict the speakers and their messages are not the
dissent-suppressing or power-hoarding officials who also feature
prominently in the history and theory of the First Amendment.51
Rather, they are responsible legislative, executive, and law enforcement figures seeking to enhance the general welfare, or seeking to
respond to particular injuries suffered by particular segments of the
population, and seeking to do it through acts and policies that generally would, the First Amendment aside, achieve precisely that
43. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
44. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (per curiam) (protecting Klan
leader who called for acts of “revengeance” against African-Americans and Jews).
45. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347-48 (2003); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 396 (1992); see also Frederick Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the First
Amendment: The Case of Cross-Burning, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 197.
46. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205-06 (7th Cir. 1978); Village of Skokie v. Nat’l
Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21, 24 (Ill. 1978). The American Nazi Party proposed the
neo-Nazis’ march (which never took place, despite their victory in court) in Skokie precisely
because of its large population of Jews in general and Holocaust survivors in particular. See
Donald A. Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate Group Speech and the First Amendment, 60 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 629, 629 (1985).
47. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002); Chelsea McLean, Note,
The Uncertain Fate of Virtual Child Pornography Legislation, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
221, 232 (2007).
48. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481-82 (2010); Frederick Schauer, Harm(s)
and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 86.
49. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 461 (2011).
50. See Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011).
51. Cf. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 580
(1983) (interpreting Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), as invalidating tax on
newspapers because it was imposed as retribution against newspapers for criticism of the
state government). See generally STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN , DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE
MEANINGS OF AMERICA (1999).
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goal. Yet despite the well-intentioned, often well-targeted, and
equally often potentially effective nature of these policies, the First
Amendment as currently interpreted prohibits their implementation, and thus once again acts as a side constraint or trump on what
would otherwise be public welfare-enhancing official actions.
This is not the place to evaluate the wisdom of these various
constitutional side constraints, either as a matter of conformity with
original constitutional intentions or original meaning, or as a matter
of less originalist judicial interpretation of the relevant constitutional provisions. Plainly, some of the decisions just cataloged are
controversial, and many people would think some of them plainly
wrong. Still, not all of the cases just described are wrong, and most
of these examples illustrate side constraints wisely and properly
applied to invalidate otherwise valuable acts and policies. In this
respect, perhaps the best characterization of many of these constraints, at least from the perspective of the policymakers and
officials they constrain, is that they are annoying. If you are a
government official or legislator and you have in mind a good policy,
or if you desire to take some seemingly desirable action, then it
would certainly seem annoying when some side constraint intrudes
and tells you that you cannot do what looks like the right thing and
looks like what your constituents believe is the right thing. And
thus, as long as at least some of these examples represent a
constitutional regime in which second-order constraints limit what
can be done even in the genuine service of the public good, the central problem remains of how such annoying second-order constraints
can be implemented.
II. ENFORCING RULES ON ONESELF52
On the assumption that at least some—and probably most—of the
annoying side constraints just described are justifiable despite the
annoyance they cause to the policymakers and policy implementers
they constrain, the question then turns to the issue of how these
constraints should be interpreted and enforced.

52. See Thomas C. Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself, 1 J.L. ECON . & ORG . 357 (1985).
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It is at this point that the central problems of constitutional
interpretive authority arise. Given that the overwhelming majority
of the rules and principles just described emerge not directly from
(virtually) inescapable constitutional text,53 they are, by and large,
the product of judicial interpretations of the text. But because the
question of who should interpret that text is precisely the matter at
issue, the question, then, becomes whether these side constraints,
or anything even resembling them, would emerge either from interpretation of the text by the executive or legislative branches of the
federal government or the states,54 or from, in some way, the
population at large.55
53. Compare, for example, the two-witness requirement in prosecutions for treason, U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 3, the minimum age and citizenship requirements for the offices of President, Vice-President, Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives, id. art. I, §§ 2-3;
id. art. II, § 1, and the extension of the franchise to women, id. amend. XIX, and eighteenyear-olds, id. amend. XXVI. For a longer list and analysis of such examples, see Frederick
Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985). For a challenge to the claim of inescapability of clear text, see Mark V. Tushnet, Comment, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in
Constitutional Theory, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 688 n.24 (1985).
54. That is, from a departmentalist approach. On departmentalism generally, see Neal
Devins & Louis Fisher, Essay, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83
(1998) (arguing that departmentalism may cure the strife created by judicial exclusivity);
Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who
Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (2004) (proposing a
limited form of departmentalism to support judicial review when executive or legislative
interpretation would be efficient and prudent); Joseph Landau, Presidential Constitutionalism
and Civil Rights, 55 WM . & MARY L. REV. 1719 (2014) (examining the President’s role in
interpreting the Constitution, especially on the issue of civil rights); Robert Nagel, The Role
of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
380 (1988) (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s authority to dictate constitutional principles
has recently increased needlessly); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO . L.J. 217 (1994) (arguing that the President
has the same authority as the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution, especially on
matters relevant to the executive branch); Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH . L. REV. 1539, 1541-42 (2005) (book review) (de-emphasizing the
importance of judicial review); Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2002) (challenging common criticisms of departmentalism); John Yoo, Judicial Supremacy Has Its Limits, 20 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 1, 6-7 (2015) (comparing the constitutional authority of judgments issued by
the Court with that of presidential pardons).
55. The reference here is to so-called popular constitutionalism. See generally LARRY D.
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
(2004) (arguing that popular constitutionalism was the dominant interpretative theory
throughout much of American history); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY
FROM THE COURTS (1999) (suggesting that less reliance on judicial supremacy could be more
reflective of the will of the people); Joseph Blocher, Response, Popular Constitutionalism and
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I have described the side constraints at issue as constraints on
consequentialist-inspired policies or welfare maximization more
generally, but it is now time to be more concrete. Specifically, constitutional side constraints typically constrain the decisions of particular governmental decision makers or decision-making institutions.
The side constraints tell police officers and school officials what they
cannot do; they tell legislators what legislation they cannot enact;
and they tell Presidents and lesser executive officials what policies
they are prohibited from pursuing and what acts they are prohibited
from taking. The question presented by departmentalism is thus
whether these various officials and institutions are the appropriate
individuals and institutions to interpret the Constitution in such a
way as to limit their own powers, constrain their own authority, and
trump their own ability to pursue the policies that they and their
constituents deem best.
I want to set aside the important possibility that public officials
under a departmentalist understanding would impose fewer constraints (as compared to under current doctrine) in the name of the
Constitution on their own powers and policies than now exist and
that this would be a desirable, or at least acceptable, consequence.
It is more than plausible to suppose, for example, that, in offering
his iconic defense of departmentalism in 1986,56 then-Attorney General Edwin Meese III understood that the nonjudicial bodies—the
executive, Congress, and the legislative and executive institutions
of the states—that he preferred as constitutional interpreters would
reach dramatically different conclusions from then-existing doctrine
the State Attorneys General, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 108 (2008) (positing that the people’s power
to elect state attorneys general—and thereby influence the enforcement of the Second
Amendment—is a form of popular constitutionalism); Katie Eyer, Lower Court Popular
Constitutionalism, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 197 (2013) (using gay marriage cases to demonstrate
the role that lower federal courts play in popular constitutionalism); Barry Friedman,
Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH . L. REV. 2596 (2003) (relying on social science
research to argue that judicial constitutional decisions tend to track popular opinion on
constitutional issues); Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning
the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003) (arguing that
the Court’s perception of constitutional values should be shaped by popular perceptions);
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial
Supremacy, 92 CALIF . L. REV. 1027 (2004) (framing judicial supremacy and popular
constitutionalism as symbiotic constructs that, together, shape American constitutional law).
56. See generally Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979
(1987).
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with respect to displaying the Ten Commandments in public
schools, one of his principal examples.57 But there is no indication
that he believed that such conclusions would diverge very much, if
at all, from the first-order policy decisions that would have been
reached by the same bodies. In other words, Attorney General
Meese likely recognized the substantive doctrinal implications of his
departmentalist stance and likely was comfortable with those
implications as a matter of first-order substance.58 Similarly, some
of today’s defenders of departmentalism, especially in the context of
executive authority, likely believe that a less constrained executive
would be desirable,59 just as some of today’s defenders of
departmentalism and popular constitutionalism, especially in the
context of individual equality rights, likely believe that the courts
are producing the wrong substantive results.60 These scholars can
thus be understood less as arguing that nonjudicial bodies are best
at determining which constraints to apply and how to apply them,
and more as arguing that fewer constraints on executive or legislative decisions would in some contexts be good as a matter of firstorder substance. Thus, Mark Tushnet, as part of his argument
against judicial supremacy, acknowledges that, with respect to the
First Amendment, nonjudicial bodies would likely produce a less
57. See id. at 988.
58. I make no claim about intentions and motives, whether Meese’s or others. That is, I
do not claim that Attorney General Meese (or any other departmentalist or popular
constitutionalist) has adopted a departmentalist stance in order to promote certain first-order
substantive outcomes, as opposed to adopting departmentalism for outcome-independent
institutional, historical, or interpretive reasons. For what it is worth, however, my own view
is that there is nothing wrong with adopting a view about constitutional interpretation or
constitutional interpretive authority in light of expectations about the first-order political or
moral proclivities of the likely occupants of various roles in the intermediate or long term. See
generally Frederick Schauer, Neutrality and Judicial Review, 22 LAW & PHIL. 217, 219 (2003).
One can believe that there are good (and bad) first-order moral principles, and that the
selection of legal and constitutional models can and should be based on their ability,
instrumentally, to achieve good moral results in the intermediate or long term, and need not
believe that views about legal or constitutional design have some sort of substantive primacy.
59. See Prakash & Yoo, supra note 54, at 1541-42; Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D.
Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 234-35 (2001) (interpreting the Constitution as granting the executive branch expansive powers over foreign
affairs); John Yoo, An Imperial Judiciary at War: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2005-2006 CATO SUP.
CT. REV. 83, 84 (criticizing the Court for refusing to defer to the executive and legislative
branches in habeas corpus decisions during the Bush Administration).
60. See Post, supra note 55, at 8.
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constraining version of the First Amendment, but that such an outcome would not necessarily be for the worse.61
The argument against some side constraints (or for significantly
fewer constraints) is, however, different from the question about
which body might be best at both locating and applying genuine side
constraints on official action. We need to distinguish, in other words,
the question of whether constraint in general or particular side
constraints are a good thing from the question about who, assuming
that constraint in general or particular side constraints are valuable, is best able to enforce those constraints. And it is precisely at
this point in the analysis that the heading of this section, and the
Thomas Schelling article on which it is based,62 becomes most germane. Schelling was analyzing the quite common phenomenon in
which we wish to impose side constraints on our own immediate
actions and on our own short-term desires.63 We wish to lose weight,
for example, and believe that consuming less sugar, or less bacon,
or fewer carbohydrates, or fewer calories, or whatever, will help us
achieve that goal. So we make a rule for ourselves. Only 1800 calories a day, say, or no bread, or no dessert, or bacon only once a week,
or something of that order.64 But then we are tempted to break the
rule, perhaps because we are, we tell ourselves, especially hungry
at this moment, or that this is an especially important occasion, or
that our mothers will be offended if we do not take a second helping
of their famous chocolate cake.65 And it is Schelling’s point that, in
the face of these kinds of short-term pressures and desires, rules
will often give way, typically assisted by various rationalizations.66
And thus he concludes that making rules for oneself is more likely
to be effective if assisted by an external enforcement mechanism.67
I focus on Schelling largely because the title of his article is so
apt. But the problem he addresses has been known for millennia,
often under the label of akrasia, or weakness of the will.68 Making
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See TUSHNET, supra note 55, at 52-53.
See Schelling, supra note 52.
See id. at 357-61.
See id. at 364.
See id. at 364-65.
See id. at 373 (describing the process of rule breakdown).
See id. at 372-73.
See Sarah Stroud, Weakness of Will, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.
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rules for ourselves is simply the more crystallized version of the
broader problem of knowing at one level what is good for us—or
good to do—in the long term, but being unable to do it in the face of
immediate pressures or desires to the contrary.
When we shift from eating to governing, or from dieting to
constitutional constraint, things become even more difficult. And
one of the reasons for this is that the constrained official often
disagrees with the substance of the constraint. In the standard
dieting, or smoking, or exercise, or saving for old age examples, the
constrained decision maker agrees that it would be good in the long
term to diet, to stop smoking, to exercise, to save more, and so on.
But she is, or fears she will be, unable to do in the short run what
she knows is right in the long run. On the other hand, suppose that
we disagree with the content of the constraint—our doctor tells us
to give up red meat, but we believe that taking vitamins, and not
abstaining from red meat, is the key to good health; or we are told
by the government to turn down our thermostats in order to help
the environment and combat climate change, but we believe that the
key to these outcomes is to restrict commercial flying and not
burden individual householders. In such cases the problem identified by Schelling and others is exacerbated.
Or perhaps it is just a different problem. Now it is not simply that
it is difficult to enforce on ourselves what we know to be good rules.
Rather, it is that it is hard—verging on impossible—to enforce on
ourselves what we believe to be bad or at least less good rules. In
such cases the importance of external coercion becomes especially
important, and thus, in the constitutional context, the possibility
that these external side constraints can be self-enforcing is especially remote.69 Part of the argument against departmentalism or
popular constitutionalism, therefore, is that such approaches do not
contain external enforcement mechanisms. These approaches differ
from ones that see courts as precisely the external enforcement
mechanisms on legislatures and the executive, for the external
enforcement drops out when we contemplate the possibility that

stanford.edu/entries/weakness-will [https://perma.cc/3338-5A6V] (last revised Jan. 16, 2014).
69. See Frederick Schauer, Lecture, Constitutionalism and Coercion, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1881,
1902 (2013).
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legislatures and the executive could enforce side constraints on
themselves.
III. FROM ENFORCEMENT TO INTERPRETATION
But now let us step back. Yes, it is challenging for officials and
policymakers to enforce on themselves those second-order rules that
they believe are sound in theory but difficult to apply to themselves
in practice. And yes, it is substantially more challenging for officials
and policymakers to enforce on themselves those second-order rules
they believe are misguided or perverse. But what about the task of
interpretation—of determining what the rules are in the first instance?
Although a few parts of the constitutional text are tolerably clear
by themselves, it remains the case that most instances of American
constitutional interpretation initially70 involve the interpretation of
more or less vague constitutional text: “Commerce ... among the
several States”;71 “the freedom of speech”;72 “unreasonable searches
and seizures”;73 “cruel and unusual punishments”;74 “Privileges” and
“Immunities”;75 “due process of law”;76 “equal protection of the
laws”;77 and so on. Moreover, and as discussed above, an important
part of American constitutionalism has traditionally involved interpretations of such provisions that front-line policymakers, officials,
and legislators will perceive as annoying. That is, a significant part
of American constitutionalism has seen courts interpreting such
vague clauses in ways that constrain even the good faith and genuinely sound policy judgments of a wide range of policymakers and
officials.78 Under such circumstances, then, is there any reason to
believe that these policymakers and officials will interpret the
Constitution in such a way as to constrain themselves, typically for
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

That is, putting aside questions about the interpretation of precedents.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Id. amend. I.
Id. amend. IV.
Id. amend. VIII.
Id. art. IV, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
Id. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
See supra Part I.
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reasons of distrust of their own abilities and inclinations?79 Will the
police officer, not constrained by a century of Fourth and Fifth
Amendment case law, decide that she needs to create rules to guard
against her own overaggressiveness in the enforcement of the law?80
And if this possibility seems fanciful, it is only a small step to
recognizing the almost-equivalent fancifulness of expecting selfenforcement from legislators and high executive officials. Will
members of Congress interpret the bicameralism and presentment
provisions in such a way as to make it difficult for them to pursue
what they perceive to be wise policies? Will officials interpret the
First Amendment in a way that takes account of the phenomenon
of the slippery slope,81 and thus tells them that they should not do
what they think is right now for fear that it will lead them to do
something that is not right in the future? Will legislators and
executives (and trial judges) interpret the Equal Protection Clause
in a way that guards against their own implicit as well as explicit
racism?

79. In Democracy and Distrust, John Hart Ely famously built much of a comprehensive
constitutional theory around distrust of officials, at least when the power and positions of
those officials were at issue. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 106, 112, 120 (1980). Given that, according to Ely, significant parts of First
and Fourteenth Amendment doctrines, among others, implicated this issue, see id. at 94-98,
we can ask whether Ely (or anyone else) believed or believes that executive and legislative
officials can systematically be trusted to interpret such constitutional provisions in a way that
would reflect this distrust of self-protecting governments and government officials.
80. A very large question, one that is relevant here but that raises issues far larger than
can be addressed in this (or any other) single Article, is whether, as a matter of institutional
design, we should prefer separate institutions to represent different goals, or whether more
unified or domain-focused institutions should take account of conflicting goals within their
own domains. To make this issue more concrete, consider the tension between, at times,
commercial growth and environmental protection. One way to deal with the issue would be
to have the agency in charge of, say, forests deal with the commercial as well as the
environmental aspects of forestry. Another way would be to have a department of commerce
and a department of environmental protection and have the two agencies with potentially
conflicting goals negotiate those conflicting goals in the context of forests, and much else. The
point seems especially germane in the context of the police. Do we expect police departments
themselves to be able to pursue the goals of law enforcement, crime control, and protection
of Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights? Or do we expect police departments to treat law
enforcement and crime control as their primary goals, subject to Fourth and Fifth Amendment
constraints interpreted and enforced by courts and departments of internal affairs, including
devices of enforcement such as discipline and the exclusionary rule?
81. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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The problem is exacerbated if we add the public—the constituents—to the equation. On the assumption that many officials, and
especially elected ones, are highly, even if not exclusively, responsive to the voting public,82 then the question shifts: Can or do members of the public set aside their first-order policy, moral, or other
preferences in the service of second-order constitutional values? And
if this is the question, then there is little reason for optimism about
the ability of the public to do just that. There are, of course, the
familiar anecdotes. Members of Congress, who presumably are generally adept at understanding and responding to public opinion,
appear to have had little hesitation in voting to criminalize flag
desecration, even in the face of evidence that such an action was
almost certain to be declared unconstitutional.83 Similarly, when
Congress amended the Communications Act to ban nonobscene but
sexually explicit “dial-a-porn” services,84 it could not have avoided
knowing that the statute was plainly unconstitutional, as became
clear with the unanimous Supreme Court decision in Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, with Justice White, not known
for fervent enthusiasm for First Amendment claims, writing for the
Court.85 And consider also the events leading up to Dickerson v.
United States, which not surprisingly demonstrated that public
concern for the constitutional rights of criminal defendants was not
much different from public concern for the rights of flag burners or
purveyors of telephonic sex services.86
Although these are cherry-picked examples, what little serious
academic research has been done on the topic produces a similar
result. When experimental subjects were given a choice between
their first-order policy or political preferences and constitutional
82. There is a vast literature on congressional motivation, but among the classics stressing voter responsiveness and a desire for reelection are RICHARD F. FENNO , JR., HOME STYLE:
HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 31 (1978); DAVID R. MAYHEW , CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 14-16 (1974).
83. See generally United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 313-15 (1990) (doomed in light
of Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989)).
84. See Pub. L. 98-214, § 8(b), 97 Stat. 1467, 1469-70 (adding subsection 223(b) to 47
U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. V 1982)), invalidated by Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115
(1989).
85. 492 U.S. at 116.
86. See 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (holding unconstitutional a congressional effort to
overrule Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
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rules seemingly negating those preferences, the subjects strongly
tended to choose their preferred policy outcomes and ignore the
constitutional constraints, and this turned out to be the case even
for law students and law clerks.87 And these results are consistent
with other studies showing that outcome preferences in particular
situations dominated rule-based preferences, even for law students
and lawyers.88
In the face of such evidence, the empirical underpinnings of
departmentalism,89 and even more of the once-fashionable popular
constitutionalism,90 turn out to be remarkably fragile. Insofar as
departmentalism (and, a fortiori, popular constitutionalism) is not
simply an indirect way of advocating less constraining constitutional
doctrines,91 it appears to rest on the belief that legislators, executives, and public officials of all varieties have the ability to interpret
the Constitution to make its constraints on those very officials
robust, and then to enforce those constraints on themselves.92 Alas,

87. See Joshua R. Furgeson et al., Behind the Mask of Method: Political Orientation and
Constitutional Interpretive Preferences, 32 LAW & HUM . BEHAV. 502, 509 (2008); see also
Joshua R. Furgeson et al., Do a Law’s Policy Implications Affect Beliefs About Its Unconstitutionality? An Experimental Test, 32 LAW & HUM . BEHAV. 219, 225 (2008).
88. See N.J. Schweitzer et al., Rule Violations and the Rule of Law: A Factorial Survey of
Public Attitudes, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 615, 633 (2007); N.J. Schweitzer et al., The Effect of
Legal Training on Judgments of Rule of Law Violations (Mar. 5, 2008) (unpublished paper
presented to the American Psychological Association, Jacksonville, Florida) (on file with author).
89. See supra note 54.
90. See supra note 55. I say “once-fashionable” to suggest (or predict) that popular
constitutionalism may become less acceptable to legal academics if and as Supreme Court
decisions become more substantively congenial to that group. But the point is also that some
of the enthusiasm for popular constitutionalism may have waned with the realization that
public nonexpert rhetoric explicitly connecting political arguments with the language of the
Constitution was important for the Tea Party Movement, for the public objections to the
Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), and for some of
the public antipathy to the Affordable Care Act. See, e.g., Jared A. Goldstein, Essay, Can
Popular Constitutionalism Survive the Tea Party Movement?, 105 NW . U. L. REV. 1807, 181819 (2011); Jared A. Goldstein, The Tea Party Movement and the Perils of Popular Originalism,
53 ARIZ. L. REV . 827, 850, 866 (2011); Mark D. Rosen & Christopher W. Schmidt, Why
Broccoli? Limiting Principles and Popular Constitutionalism in the Health Care Case, 61
UCLA L. REV. 66, 99-100 (2013); Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political
Response to Kelo, 93 MINN . L. REV. 2100, 2108-14 (2009); Ilya Somin, Essay, The Tea Party
Movement and Popular Constitutionalism, 105 NW . U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 300, 304 (2011).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
92. See, e.g., Johnsen, supra note 54, at 112.
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there appears to be little evidence to support that belief, and
considerable evidence to the contrary.93
IV. INTERPRETATION AND MOTIVATED REASONING
The problem of executive and legislative constitutional interpretation is magnified once we take account of what psychologists describe as “motivated reasoning”94 and the related but not identical
phenomenon of “confirmation bias.”95 The idea, increasingly part of
the legal as well as the psychological literature,96 is that, even with
respect to factual rather than normative matters, a person’s normative or outcome preferences will significantly influence what they
perceive, how they perceive it, and how they evaluate it.97 Just as
opposing tennis players, for example, will have different views about
whether on the same shot the same ball was on or outside the
line—views that track their interests and preferences—so too do we
now know that much the same phenomenon pervades our decisionmaking lives.98
The lessons of the research on motivated reasoning for questions
of interpretation should be clear. We can expect generally, albeit of
course not universally, that legal and constitutional interpreters, at
least of texts (or cases or lines of cases, for that matter) that are

93. See, e.g., supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
94. See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 495
(1990); see also David M. Bersoff, Why Good People Sometimes Do Bad Things: Motivated
Reasoning and Unethical Behavior, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL . BULL. 28, 37 (1999);
Mason Richey, Motivated Reasoning in Political Information Processing: The Death Knell of
Deliberative Democracy?, 42 PHIL. SOC. SCI. 511, 516-17 (2012).
95. See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many
Guises, 2 REV. GEN . PSYCHOL. 175, 191-92 (1998); Keith E. Stanovich, Richard F. West &
Maggie E. Toplak, Myside Bias, Rational Thinking, and Intelligence, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS
PSYCHOL. SCI. 259, 259 (2013).
96. See, e.g., EILEEN BRAMAN , LAW , POLITICS, AND PERCEPTION: HOW POLICY PREFERENCES
INFLUENCE LEGAL REASONING 29-31 (2009); Joshua Furgeson & Linda Babcock, Legal
Interpretation and Intuitions of Public Policy, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW 684, 68889 (Jon Hanson ed., 2012); Dan M. Kahan, Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive
Reflection, 8 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 407, 408-09 (2013); Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme
Court, 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems
for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2011).
97. See sources cited supra note 95.
98. Cf. supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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open to interpretation,99 will interpret the text in a way that is
consistent with their first-order substantive preferences.100 And thus
when we are talking about interpreters interpreting a constitutional
text that limits their own powers, we can expect that this process of
what we might call “self-interpretation” will produce interpretations
that systematically remove those constraints that are inconsistent
with the interpreters’ preferences about their own powers. Or, more
simply, we can expect that interpreters interpreting the constitutional provisions that constrain and annoy them will incline towards
interpretations that remove the annoyances.
In important respects, none of this is new. For centuries, a core
principle of the English doctrine of natural justice—close to the
American idea of procedural due process—has been the principle of
nemo debet esse judex in propria causa—no man should be judge of
his own cause.101 And if we apply this maxim to the question of
departmentalism, the lesson is that there may well be good reasons
not to let officials determine the scope and strength of the very
principles that are designed to constrain those officials’ own actions.
Implicit in departmentalism, arguably even more than in popular
constitutionalism,102 is that officials can be trusted to make
decisions about the “cause” of their own powers and the limitations
that have been or are to be put on those powers.103 The ancient nemo
debet maxim, however, as well as modern psychological research
and insights from political economy, appear to suggest otherwise.104

99. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Dr. Bonham’s Case (1610), 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 652; 8 Co. Rep. 113b; D.E.C.
Yale, Iudex in Propria Causa: An Historical Excursus, 33 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 80, 80 (1974). For
the interesting suggestion, relevant to this Article, that the principle has not been applied to
American administrative agencies and that such agencies routinely determine their own
jurisdiction and the constraints on it, see Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Contra Nemo Iudex in Sua
Causa: The Limits of Impartiality, 122 YALE L.J. 384, 399 (2012).
102. Under a genuine popular constitutionalism, which may or may not exist in reality, the
people might have much more of a desire to constrain their elected officials and other government employees than those officials and employees have a desire to constrain themselves. See,
e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 55, at 1027-32.
103. See, e.g., Johnsen, supra note 54, at 106.
104. See Zamir & Medina, supra note 15, at 366; supra notes 87-88, 96-97 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION: BACKING INTO JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
Larry Alexander and I have argued that courts may be better
suited than legislators or executives to preside over the settlement
function of the law—that is, the law’s ability to provide authoritative (even if not final) resolution of conflicting moral claims.105 In
many respects this might be understood as a positive argument for
judicial interpretive supremacy. It is, after all, an argument that
stresses something at which courts might be comparatively good.
By contrast, the argument in this Article is largely negative. The
argument here is not very much about why courts in general and
the Supreme Court in particular would be good at interpreting the
Constitution, and especially the constitutional side constraints
imposed on the states, on the executive, and on Congress. Rather,
the argument stresses that there is reason to believe that the states
might not be very trustworthy to adjudicate the limits on their own
powers,106 that legislators might not be particularly able to fairly
interpret and determine the constraints on congressional authority,
and that Presidents and those who work for them might have an
interest in understanding their powers broadly and the limitations
on those powers narrowly.107 All of this suggests the negative argument for judicial interpretive supremacy. Just as Winston Churchill
memorably opined that democracy is the worst system of government, with the exception of all of the others,108 so too is it more than
plausible to believe that courts are at best flawed interpreters of the
Constitution and flawed candidates to interpret the Constitution for
105. See supra note 8.
106. As long ago noted by Justice Story in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304, 347 (1816).
107. I do not deny, of course, that the same pathologies might affect the courts when they
are determining the scope of their own powers. But in addition to the fact that most of the side
constraints in the Constitution are constraints on the states, on Congress, and on the executive, and not so much on the judiciary, there is some reason to believe that courts on occasion
can make rulings that limit rather than expand their own jurisdiction and power. See Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 803, 809-10 (2005).
108. “[D]emocracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have
been tried from time to time.” Winston Spencer Churchill, Speech to the House of Commons
(Nov. 11, 1947), in 7 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL : HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES 1897-1963, at 7563,
7566 (Robert Rhodes James ed., 1974).

1712

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1689

everyone, but that they are likely less flawed than any of the other
candidates for the job. Judicial interpretive supremacy may indeed
be the worst form of constitutional fidelity and enforcement, but it
may still be superior to all of the others.

